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PREFACE 
 
This report is a product of the one year long study and research of the author following the 
award in January 2002 of the International Policy Fellowship by the Center for Policy 
Studies without which I could not have completed successfully this project. The report 
represents an attempt to conceptualize the security sector reform in South East Europe 
and to put down some important tools in dealing with challenges posed by the security 
services in the region. It is a by-product of the research paper that was written on the same 
subject in the framework of the International Policy Fellowship.1 
                                                
My deepest appreciation 
goes to the International Policy Fellowship program, to Pamela Kilpadi, the Director of the 
International Policy Fellowship, and her staff, Csilla Kaposvari, Mladen Momcilovic, 
Merrill Oates and Olean Sydarenko, for their support during the Fellowship and to Stevo 
Pendarovski and Paul Roe for their mentorship of me on this fellowship.  
 Although they may not recognize their influence on the pages that follow, my thinking 
on the issue in general owes much to their wisdom and insight: Ronald Asmus, Robert 
Baric, Joseph C. Bell, Janusz Bugajski, Esther Brimmer, Frances Burwell, Eva Busza, 
Gheorghe Ciascai, Bart d’Hooge, Miroslav Dimitrov, Nikola Dimitrov, Viorel Duema, James 
Goldgeier, Stewart Henderson, John Hulsman, Zlatko Isakovic, Zeljko Ivanis, Bruce 
Jackson, Obrad Kesic, Charles Kupchan, Donald Kursch, Gary Litman, Paul McCarthy, 
Ronald McNamara, Steven Meyer, Konstantin Nesterov, Minna Nikolova, Jim O'Brian, 
Daniel Serwer, Radek Sikorski, Jeffrey Simon, Stoyan Stankulov, Katarina Staronova, 
Stanimir Tchernes, Edwin Truman, Vatroslav Vekaric, Vladimir Velichkov, Yantsislav 
Yanakiev, Maria Yordanova. The manuscript was read in its entirety by Stevo Pendarovski, 
Paul Roe, each of whom contributed a variety of helpful criticism and suggestion.  
 I am grateful to the Director of the East European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Martin Sletzinger, who was an excellent host during my 
three-month fellowship at the Center, to his staff Sabina Auger and Meredith Knepp and 
to the Director of the Center, Lee Hamilton. I must also thank Janet Spikes and her staff at 
the library of the Wilson Center, who made great efforts to help me in obtaining the very 
 
1 The research paper can be accessed at http://www.policy.hu/yusufi.  
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wide range of books and other materials from both Center’s library and the Library of 
Congress that were necessary to carry out my research.  
 All these friends, critics and associates facilitated the creative process, but in the end, 
of course, it remains my study and my responsibility. With all this help, the remaining 
errors and deficiencies must be clearly mine alone.  
  
Islam Yusufi  
 
Gostivar, Macedonia, February 28, 2003 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Unreformed Security Sector  
 
 For decades, the security sector services in the region of South East Europe were 
widely associated with violence, discrimination and insecurity. Only very recently, 
the commitment for reform of the security sector started to occupy the agenda of 
the South East European countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro.  
 The programs and initiatives of the international community such as the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe of 1999 created a new momentum for transforming 
and restructuring the security sector in the region, particularly as the problems 
posed by the unreformed security sector would jeopardize other efforts for 
enhancing the democracy, rule of law and human rights and for creating 
functioning market economies in the region.  
 The current framework at the national, regional and international level for the 
security sector reform does not provide a comprehensive and suitable framework 
for how to fulfill reforms in the current local circumstances and conditions in the 
region of South East Europe. The fundamental premises of the current approaches 
to the security sector reform are based on the conditionality of the international 
organizations and there is a lack of local ownership on the issue.   
 The complexity and unpredictability of the region’s security reforms calls for the 
rethinking and rearrangement of some of the available instruments for security 
reforms in the direction of strengthening democratization and stabilization in the 
region.  
 
The Challenges and Opportunities Ahead 
 
 Many factors distinguish the security reforms in the region of South East Europe 
from other reforms. There are some specifics in South East Europe that merit 
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deeper attention in the process of defining strategies for security sector reform in 
South East Europe, including historical legacies; politicization of reform efforts; 
inability to deliver security; weakness of the state; weakness of the civil society; and 
corruption and organized crime.   
 Several suggestions for creative policies with respect to the security sector reform 
in South East Europe: more local ownership and greater local responsibilities; 
development of democratic practices; professionalization; security sector-
community interaction; and reforms in civilian side of government.  
 
New Agenda for Security Reforms in South East Europe  
 
 Adopting an agenda for security sector reform in South East Europe would signify 
the progressive and balanced shift of the position of the national governments and 
the international community: from stabilization to democratization and integration 
and from international to greater local responsibilities.    
 Even in the best-case scenario, a set of strategies and institutions different from the 
ones employed in the other areas are needed in security sector reform in order to 
cope with the specific requirements for democratization and stabilization in the 
region.  
 What may have worked reasonably well in other reforms areas requires additional 
endeavors in the case of security sector reform due to the different challenges this 
sector poses.  
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
¾ More local ownership and greater local responsibilities: The governments of the 
South East European countries in pursuing their efforts for security sector reform 
should pursue more ownership in the undertaken reforms rather than seeing it as a 
conditionality of international factors.  
 
¾ From Defense to Security: There has been growing blurring of police and military 
roles, which is unhealthy in the long term. The countries of South East Europe 
should shift their resources from the military to the civilian police forces. In 
particular, greater resources need to be allocated to public-order policing and 
border security, as violent crowd incidents, mass protests, illegal immigration, and 
cross-border smuggling of arms, narcotics and people are on the rise.  
 
¾ Stability Pact: So far we cannot say that the Stability Pact has been able to change 
the status quo in the region and it does not stand to do so. Therefore, it is of the 
interest of South East European countries to transform it into an institution that 
will serve for the region’s integration into EU and to serve as a clearinghouse to 
promote cross-border cooperation in road construction, telecommunications and 
energy supplies.  
 
¾ Governance: In all seven countries of South East Europe efforts to be made to 
institute sound and continuous cooperation among the relevant governmental 
agencies and to strengthen the professionalism in the security sector services in 
order to increase the ability and willingness of the bureaucrats in these services 
effectively and efficiently to implement policies.  
 
¾ Reforms in Civilian Side of Government: The governments of South East Europe 
should undertake efforts to deal with the ills that lie outside the security sector and 
within the public administration and at large. Adequate necessary reforms shall be 
undertaken in ministries of defense, ministries of interior, parliaments, and offices 
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of presidents that will increase their ability to control and oversight the security 
sector agencies.  
 
¾ Civilian Security Community: Development of the strong community of civilian 
intellectuals that will be engaged in security issues is of crucial importance to 
security sector reform as civil society is a central to the legitimization of security 
sector. Creation of a security community is also central for the public’s support for 
the security sector’s participation in the humanitarian and other missions that 
require wider public support for their successful realization and implementation.  
 
¾ Judiciary: It is essential to build a security system based on rule of law and human 
dignity. There is inability and lack of desire on the part of judiciary to prosecute 
law enforcement officials who cross the line. Much remains to be done in rooting 
out corruption, improving the working of courts and protecting individual liberties.  
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I. UNREFORMED SECURITY SECTOR  
 
For decades, the security sector services were widely associated with violence, discrimination and insecurity. The army, police, intelligence agencies and other 
security sector agencies overstepping their constitutional and legal bounds and 
engaging in widespread abuses, organized crime and corruption became frequent cases in 
South East European countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The entire check and balances and 
control system became inefficient and ineffective. The national parliaments under the 
influence of the corrupt and organized crime syndicates functioning within the state 
security structures were not able to oversight and control the actions of these agencies. 
Judicial branches of the government, not willing and able to act independently, 
predominantly became in the service only of a particular group or faction of the political 
elites. Expectations for higher returns, combined with the increased rates of poverty and 
unemployment and decreasing standards of living, led to the involvement of the security 
structures in the smuggling and trafficking of arms, drugs, and people.  
 In sum, security sector agencies became obstacles in the strengthening of the 
governance and in the improvement of the security situation, contributing to the increase 
of the instability and insecurity in the region and hindering the efforts for democratization 
and integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and EU.  
 Today, the unreformed security sector continues to plague democratization efforts of 
the countries of South East Europe. Only very recently, the commitment for reform of the 
security sector started to occupy the agenda of the countries of the region. The security 
sector reform has become the political talk in their capitals. It is emerging as the last point 
of the entire process of the stabilization and democratization of the region, providing both 
the countries of South East Europe and the international community with a real prospect 
for a breakthrough that would lead the region away from the instability and insecurity and 
towards the stability, democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of 
NATO and EU.  
 Thus, the security sector reform is emerging as the important part of the process of 
democratization and integration of the region into Europe as the effective and efficient 
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security sector can enable the citizens to conduct their political, economic, social and 
cultural activities without being under the fear of possible violence. Inefficient and 
ineffective security sector can cause major violations of human rights and can disrupt the 
democratization efforts. Security sector reform is also important for conflict prevention. 
Efficient security sector, can add to stability. It can facilitate the effective management of 
tensions and it can act as an important confidence building measure. 
 The programs and initiatives of the international community such as the Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe of 1999 has created a new momentum for transforming and 
restructuring the security sector in the region, particularly as the problems posed by the 
unreformed security sector would jeopardize other efforts for enhancing the democracy, 
rule of law and human rights and for creating functioning market economies in the region. 
Besides Stability Pact, other multilateral and bilateral donors such as NATO, EU, OSCE, 
World Bank, OECD, and DFID, and USAID, have demonstrated a considerable readiness to 
pledge and commit substantial funds for the security sector reform.  
 There is also an ever-growing awareness in the region and internationally, that the role 
of security sector reform has implications for the overall democratization of the region. The 
South East European countries have by now accepted that the unreformed security sector 
is damaging their efforts for democratization and integration and that the challenges posed 
by it are comprehensive, and that solutions should be pursued in national, regional as well 
as in international level simultaneously. This gives the prospect for democratization and 
stability of the region a new momentum to enhance the region’s governance structures, to 
achieve higher democratization and to promote overall further integration into EU and 
NATO institutions. It also provides additional impetus in the creation of the strong and 
viable state security structures as the countries of South East Europe possess weak 
security governance structures that are under the heavy influence of corruption and 
organized crime.  
 Security sector reform process is an important accession criterion for South East 
European countries wanting to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. While future decisions on 
accession are likely to be decided as much by political reasons as by specific security sector 
reform successes of the countries of the region, security sector reform remains an 
important factor in South East European countries’ endeavors to join these institutions. 
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 Reform of the security sector is a continuing process. Political and security 
environments surrounding security sector are inherently dynamic. All countries have to be 
able to adapt their security structures to the new conditions fast and effectively as 
established and functioning democracies adapt their security sector in accordance with the 
changing circumstances. However, the political pattern and inherent instability in their 
political systems, the transitional countries of South East Europe have confronted with 
great difficulties in adapting their security sector structures. The fragility of the public 
opinion as crucial factor in promoting reforms in security sector oscillating between 
reformist and nationalist agenda, has exacerbated the ability of the South East European 
countries to adapt to the new environment.  
 It has been the snowball effects of democratization waves coming from the north that 
have enhanced the agenda for reforming the security sector. Domino-style influences of the 
changes in Central Europe, have encouraged the countries of South East Europe to follow 
the suit and institute democratic procedures in the security sector. Also, the increased 
interest of the countries of South East Europe to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures of 
NATO and EU and the readiness of the western democracies to assist these countries, have 
further strengthened the reform agenda in security sector.  
 Generally, there has been slowing reform pace in the region. What has compromised 
the process of security sector reform has been the continuous identification of security 
sector reform with simple personnel removal and changes of structures, even where this 
has been done based on personal desires and interests, or political interference. There has 
also been lack of clear strategy for security reforms.  
 The security sector reform is basically promoted institutionally in the region at the 
international level by the Stability Pact as well as in some respects by NATO, EU, OSCE, 
Western European Union, World Bank, OECD, and other bilateral donors such as DFID 
and USAID. The Stability Pact with its special provisions on security sector reform has 
stimulated thinking about how to implement comprehensive reform in the security sector. 
Security sector reform has become a major area in the framework of the Stability Pact. It 
has helped to strengthen the concept of security sector reform, and gave further option for 
the coordination among international organizations in the field.  
 With its Working Table III on defense and security issues, the Stability Pact has 
worked on reforming the security sector and on creating a climate of confidence and 
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security throughout the region. It has worked on different areas of security sector reform 
and accordingly has established various initiatives and institutions for the fulfillment of 
the security sector reforms, for which the Stability Pact has been credited as success. 
Conversely, from its very inception it has also suffered from a considerable lack of 
credibility, both among its local and among its international partners, particularly with 
respect to its role of producing more words than action.  
 The current framework at the national, regional and international level for the security 
sector reform does not provide a comprehensive and suitable framework for how to fulfill 
reforms in the current circumstances and conditions locally in the region of South East 
Europe. The fundamental premises of the current approaches to the security sector reform 
are based on the conditionality of the international organizations and there is a lack of 
local ownership on the issue. These premises cause confusion in the policies for reform. By 
their very logic, these approaches have been successful in the countries that have 
successfully faced the challenges of political and economic reform, however they have not 
been realizable in the countries such as the South East European ones.  
 In sum, while there is both regional and international commitment for security reforms, 
difficulties in realizing them in practice persist. The complexity and unpredictability of the 
region’s security reforms calls for the rethinking and rearrangement of some of the available 
instruments for security reforms in the direction of strengthening democratization and 
stabilization in the region.  
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II. THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD 
 
There are number of factors that distinguish the security reforms in the region of South East Europe from other reforms. Unlike in other reform areas, the issues of 
peace and security have predominated this sector. In sum, there are some specifics 
in South East Europe that merit deeper attention in the process of defining strategies for 
security sector reform in South East Europe.  
 1. Historical Legacies: The complex historical legacies such as ethnic divisions, 
totalitarian and authoritarian inheritances, play a crucial role in the reform agenda of these 
countries. The historical legacies do not as such prevent reforms, but they inhibit their 
fulfillment and depending on the circumstances, divert the process of reforms from 
democratic outcomes. The current implications of these legacies whether in the form of 
weak governance and fragile civil society, derail the process of security sector reform. All 
these legacies and implications act as “confining conditions” constraining the reform 
efforts.  
 2. Politicization: The process of security sector reform is proceeding when there is high 
politicization of the reform efforts. The results of the process of security sector reform will 
depend on the outcome of the clash of nationalist, on the one hand, and 
reformist/integration-oriented politicians, on the other. 
 3. Inability to deliver security: In all the countries of South East Europe there is 
generally a continued inability of the political and security system to deliver security as a 
public good that leads to a heightened sense of insecurity and continued social and 
economic stratification.  
 4. Weakness of the State: Capacity problems of security sector have manifested 
themselves in a number of ways across South East Europe. These include inexistence of the 
cooperation among the governmental structures of the same government; state structures 
unable and unwilling to implement security policies; and lack of expertise among civil 
servants in security sector bureaucracies. The governmental institutions of the states of 
South East Europe, because of their weak economies and democracies, and lack of 
managerial cultures, do not cooperate instead they compete over spheres of competence. A 
fact that undermines a state’s legitimacy and promotes uncontrolled conflicts.  
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 Moreover, in most countries in the region there is an absence of effective political elites 
that will show an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental structures. This 
leads to a lack of commitment to reform at the mid-level bureaucrats who remain 
unconvinced of or does not understand the rationale behind the reform efforts. Finally, due 
to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians that can undertake reforms, reform 
programs are not becoming realized.  
 5. Weakness of the Civil Society: Another problem that poses major challenges to the 
reform efforts of the countries of South East Europe concerns the weakness of the civil 
society and lack of its contribution to the overall reforms in the region. The countries of the 
region shall develop civilian security cadre and intellectuals that have skills and experience 
in security issues. Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will 
be engaged in security issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as civil 
society is a central to the legitimization of security sector.  
 6. Corruption and Organized Crime: Among other obstacles that prevent solid security 
sector reform in South East Europe are corruption and organized crime. South East Europe 
is major case where is the strong relationship between corruption and organized crime on 
the one hand, and security sector on the other. Corruption and organized crime stand as 
key impediments to a process of sustained security reform, as they have become endemic 
and they have had impact upon security relationships and institutions with following 
implications: have weakened the ability of the states to provide security for society as a 
whole; have compromised policy and have exposed domestic political and economic 
processes to external influence, and have called into question the credibility of the rule of 
law.  
 
Several suggestions for creative policies with respect to the security sector reform in South 
East Europe: 
 1. More local ownership and greater local responsibilities: Security sector problems are 
most important problems of the societies in transition in South East Europe. The real 
question South East European societies are confronted is whether their governments will 
be guided by the logic of conditionalities of the international and transnational 
organizations or by the logic of reforming the security sector as a result of the demand of 
the national and local public opinion. Security reforms guided by the general public 
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opinion and framed according to the national circumstances, would serve to a great extent 
to the overall goals of security sector reforms and institute sound basis for sustainable 
democratic and civil reforms in this area. Without a strong national public support and 
without more local responsibilities and leadership, undertaken reforms will not create 
sustainability in adapting the security structures according to the developments in the 
society and wider.  
 2. Development of Democratic Practices: For the security sector reforms to be 
successful, attention should be paid on overall transformation of the sector from its 
organizational, administrative, functional, cultural and operational standpoint and in this 
context, major emphasis should be put on development of the democratic forms within it. 
These processes should be continuous and they should be shaped in accordance with the 
changes and democratic developments in the society, as a whole.  
 3. Professionalization: New challenges facing security sector in South East Europe 
increasingly are characterized as very sophisticated, which worsens the capability of the 
security sector to face them. Therefore, the imperative is to increase the level of 
professionalization of civil servants in the security sector in order to better come to terms 
to the demands of the citizens.  
 4. Security Sector-Community Interaction: Security sector is most effective and most 
easily fulfills its functions when has the sympathies of the public and when it cooperates 
with the wider public. Therefore, there should be community involvement in the work of 
security sector and there should be a local partnership between citizens and security 
sector. However, it is the obligation of the security sector and not of the citizens to initiate 
this cooperation and partnership. Only in that way, the security sector can become a model 
and give a confidence, and only then the people will seek it for support and cooperation.  
 5. Reforms in Civilian Side of Government: Security sector reforms without adequate 
necessary reforms in the civilian side of a given government as well cannot have its effects. 
For security sector reform to be successful the reforms in ministries of defense, ministries 
of interior, parliaments, and offices of presidents as the oversight organs of security sector 
should also be taken into consideration. These in the initial period of reforms do not attract 
the attention of reformers, however these factors if not included in the reform agenda, 
become contributors to the disorder and also provide conditions which breed further 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the work of the security sector.   
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III. NEW AGENDA FOR SECURITY REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE  
 
The countries of South East Europe were successful in completion of the first generation reforms that included the establishment of new institutions, structures 
and chains of responsibility for the security sector and appropriate structures for 
its democratic control. With these reforms, the South East European countries laid the 
basis of the principles and structures for oversight of the security sector; empowered the 
parliaments to oversee and approve security sector budgets; to a great extent civilianized 
the security sector bureaucracies; and provided the legal ground for reforming and 
professionalizing security sector formations.  
 However, the current conditions require more than the first generation reforms. They 
are not enough, what is also necessary is to undertake reforms that can be titled under the 
second generation reforms that will be concerned with the further consolidation of 
democratic control of security sector; strengthening of the procedures of transparency in 
the security sector; wider engagement of civil society and creation of a strong civilian 
security community; development of the community policing processes; enhancing the 
ability for effective border protection; reforming intelligence services; tackling the 
proliferation of small arms; and complementarily reforming the judiciary.  
 These reforms are crucial in transforming South East European countries’ security 
sectors, which is in support of creation of a functioning democratic state and society in 
which the citizens are able to live without fear, whose human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are guaranteed and whose property rights are protected.  
 
Democratic Control: The countries of South East Europe have succeeded in creating legal 
structures that subordinates the security sector to political and civilian role, and at the 
same time have divided control over security matters between the legislative, executive and 
judiciary branches. However, this legal framework have not been adequately 
operationalized in the practice as a result of the ambiguities in the institutional 
framework; polarized domestic politics, influencing badly the general national security 
situation of a country; the low level of civilian expertise in security issues; and the 
Security Sector Reform in South East Europe 17 
inadequate balancing of the separated powers of the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of a government.  
 Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania are facing problems of gaps in the legislative 
framework and there is an unclear division of responsibility between the President, 
Ministry of Defense and the Chief of General Staff.  In particular, power to mobilize the 
armed forces during an emergency needs to be legally clarified in the future as they leave 
substantial room for bureaucratic battles.     
 In Croatia problems remain in a disproportionate balance of power between the 
president and parliament. A primary concern for the future is the need to enhance the role 
of parliament controlling the security institutions, and serious efforts need to be made in 
order to circumscribe some of the authority of the presidency in this area. In Albania, the 
establishment of the legal democratic control of the security sector has not made it 
possible to keep the security sector off the services required by the political elites.  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro hardly fulfill the requirements for 
having instituted civilian control over the security sector because they lack unity in their 
security sector structures. Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a ministry of defense at the state 
level. Serbia and Montenegro is a new state and it is yet to be defined the responsibilities of 
the civilian structures that will be entitled to oversight and control the security sector.   
 Particularly, parliament as a legislative branch of the government in all these countries 
does not yet have political influence comparable to that of many analogues western 
institutions. Parliaments committees that are entitled to oversight the security sector, very 
often lack necessary information and appropriate financial and human resources or 
necessary professionals and experts. There is also general lack of knowledge among 
parliamentarians about security issues.  
 
Transparency: Transparency is a challenging concept for South East European societies with 
weak or even non-existent, traditions in holding security sector actors to account. That is 
particularly true in sensitive areas such as security, where myths and culture of secrecy 
prevail. The lack of transparency has created a space for creation of the non-accountable 
security forces under the authority of the elected ministers, prime ministers and 
presidents. In Serbia, Prime Minister Djindjic controlled certain ministry of interior forces 
for political reasons. President Kostunica as well has used the army troops in his dealings 
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with his political opponents. In Macedonia, non-accountability of the security sector 
brought to the creation of the paramilitary forces, Lions, controlled by the former minister 
of interior who were often involved in the violation of human rights.  
 These and other paramilitary forces, continue to function and flourish and become 
more politically and economically viable at the expense of security sector reform efforts. 
These structures have become defenders of the ruling party’s interests and they have 
become extended hand of the ruling elites for the functioning of the politics by other 
means. As politicians have become creators of these informal structures, they have been 
unable to reform or to dismantle them. The existence of these shadow networks is highly 
probable to remain for many years to come as they continue to receive funds from illicit 
trade of arms, drugs and human beings.   
 Some countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro still lack doctrinal security documents such as national security strategy that 
would provide a solid basis for transparency in security policy and the process of security 
planning. Therefore in many cases, the problem is not in non-accessibility but in non-
existence of these strategic documents. The security policy of a given country may be 
considered transparent if decision-makers are aware of and society is informed on the 
policy goals, existing and planned means to achieve the goals, and the cost of sustaining 
those means. 
 Of South East European countries that were lucky not to be involved in conflict, such 
as Bulgaria and Romania, they were able to establish transparency procedures more easily 
than the countries that were affected by the conflicts in the region 
 
Civilian Security Community: Another second-generation issue concerns the development of 
civilian security cadre and intellectuals that have skills and experience in security issues. 
Post-communist security sector of South East Europe possess hardly security communities 
as they are still closed to civilians and resist civilian interference.  
 Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will be engaged in 
security issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as civil society is a central 
to the legitimization of security sector. Creation of a security community is also central for 
the public’s support for the security sector’s participation in the humanitarian and other 
missions that require wider public support for their successful realization and 
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implementation. Moreover, it provides an alternative source of information on security 
issues for both policy makers and wider public. Furthermore, it also provides the 
opportunity for popular debate, discussion and criticism of security issues. In addition, it 
can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the security sector to 
account through exposing malpractice, forming critical judgments and so on.   
  
Community Policing: South East European countries require police reform to be designed and 
implemented in a way that will deepen and strengthen democratic values, increase the 
community policing and overcome the confidence gap between citizens and police. One of 
the central sources of the community policing is the organizational and functional 
decentralization of the police structures. Following 1989 changes, not all South East 
European countries adopted the common European trend of decentralizing the police and 
empowering the local governments with policing.  
 Another source of the community policing is the adequate representation of the 
minority groups in the police structures. One of the internal deficiencies of the police in the 
region is the lack of minority and women police officers. Over the years, there has been 
growing number of minority and women police officers being recruited in the police, 
however, they still do not correspond to the current composition of the minority ethnic 
groups and women in the overall population of a given country. This applies to all South 
East European countries, as they possess large minority groups that are not represented 
adequately in the police structures. The countries have undertaken efforts to close this gap, 
however there are still things to be made and there much work remains to be done to 
tackle the recruitment and promotion practices in the region. 
 
Border Protection: Military definition of border security - which characterized the cold war 
era – is not relevant any longer given the completely changed security environment. 
According to the contemporary democratic procedures and practices, border protection 
should be carried out by a special police force that will not form part of the regular state 
police but neither it should belong to the national defense forces and that will operate 
under the auspices of either the ministry of interior or ministry of justice.  
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 The task of creating such a system now confronts the countries of South East Europe. 
Over the last years, they have gradually undertaken reforms in reorganizing their 
structures of the border protection, changing it form a military organization with 
conscripted staff into a police organization with purely professional staff.    
 
Intelligence Services: The South East European countries, as part of their first generation 
reforms, in early 1990s adopted a necessary legal framework in which intelligence services 
operate. This framework defined the area of responsibility of these services, the limits of 
their competence and the mechanisms of oversight and accountability.  
 Due to the enormous role that the intelligence services have played before 1989 and 
during the transition process, their transformation entails great political, security and 
societal difficulties. Therefore, because of the possible implications of the reform of the 
services, the countries of South East Europe, have adopted gradual reform of these services.  
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, until very recently several intelligence services were 
operating under the heavy influence of the ruling governments. Currently, there is not yet 
state level intelligence service, instead there are two separate intelligence services 
operating separate in both entities of the country. 
 In Romania, intelligence services pose different challenges. It is of great concern the 
presence of members of former Securitate in the current security sector of the country. In 
Albania, former Sigurimi’s former agents unable to be reintegrated into the new 
circumstances have found work in the black market, and particularly in the running of 
people, drugs and arms.  
 
Proliferation of Small Arms: Although South East European countries have made significant 
improvements to their arms export, import and production control policies and legislation 
in recent years, the region continues to be important source, destination and transit route 
for transfers of weapons and illicit shipments of arms. The illicit trafficking of arms, 
coupled with high unemployment in the region and mistrust between the ethnic 
communities remains a serious threat to the peace and stability in the region. The legacy of 
a decade of violence led to the wide-spread illicit possession and trading of the small arms 
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and light weapons, which in turn led to the resurgence of gun culture in some parts of the 
region.  
 There have been number of disarmament actions in the region, including in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. Both Bulgaria 
and Romania have the capability to develop major weaponry and produce a range of small 
arms and ammunition that they export to outside world, sometimes happening to enter to 
the sensitive destinations such as Iraq. These two countries have to make efforts to prevent 
their countries of continuing of being the arms bazaar for rebels and rogues and other five 
South East European countries should make steps to prevent of becoming destination and 
transit route for small arms and to prevent their own citizens of possessing illicit weapons.  
 The region is also suffering from inconsistent policies at the international level and by 
the lack of regional cooperation in this field. Although certain steps have been taken by the 
Stability Pact with its Regional Implementation Plan for Combating the Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons to fill out the gap that exist in a regional-level approach, 
the Plan is yet to be operationalized in practice.  
 
Judiciary: It is essential to build a security system based on rule of law and human dignity. 
In South East Europe judicial branches of the government are subject to manipulation by 
the executive branch. Investigations into security sector abuses frequently prove fruitless 
and charges of wrongdoing are rare. There is inability and lack of desire on the part of 
judiciary to prosecute law enforcement officials who cross the line. Much remains to be 
done in rooting out corruption, improving the working of courts and protecting individual 
liberties.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As evidenced, much yet needs to be achieved. It is an imperative that this reform process 
develops in a holistic and efficient manner, so that the security sector can continue to 
develop in the direction of responsiveness, representation and greater professionalism. The 
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challenge for the security sector in South East Europe as a whole is to create a modern 
system of governance that promotes, supports and sustains law and order.  
 In conclusion, a set of strategies and institutions different from the ones employed in 
the other areas are needed in security sector reform in order to cope with the specific 
requirements for democratization and stabilization in the region and in order to 
successfully complement the process of security reforms. A more realistic scenario calls for 
a consistent and transparent overall strategy with more coherent sets of policies and 
instruments providing concrete “stepping stones.” The paradigm for security sector reform 
should change from peace and security to democratization and integration. Thus, what is 
necessary now is a comprehensive re-arrangement of existing tools and policies in a single 
framework. The development of a flexible and informal national common roof under which 
all current strategic objectives, actors and initiatives would be re-arranged to create 
dynamic synergies would be the acknowledgement of this paradigm shift.   
  
